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1. Introduction
Teach for America (TFA) aims to some day make it possible for every American
child to receive a great education. As means to that end TF A attempts to get teachers
"willing to go above and beyond the constraints of the system to ensure that their students
excel" into classrooms, to encourage "long-term, sustained leadership in education;" and
to "change the prevailing ideology around educational inequity," which supports a
rationalization that poor children achieve less than others because they are unmotivated
and do not receive support at home (see www.teachforamerica.org). The organization
argues that teachers alone cannot change the system, but that by influencing future
leaders it can make the issue of educational equity a major focus for policy and funding.
Corps members are at once conceived of as teachers and as backers-in-training.
TF A argues that these are complements - no learning without good teachers, no
support for learning without backers, and no faith in the power of teaching without a
change in ideology. While all are important, because support, faith in teaching, and good
teachers already exist a program which increased only one of them could be sufficient to
change education, though not necessarily enough to achieve TFA's goal. However, it is
possible that by recruiting, selecting, and training teachers for all three goals the program
does not achieve each of them to the best of its ability. For the purposes of this analysis,
I assume that while creating backers and changing ideology almost definitely improve
education in the long run, school districts that are involved with TF A need to know that
the program at least does no harm to current students, and ideally improves their
immediate outcomes.
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While serving as teachers, TF A corps members are able to affect their own
students, those outside their classes, and the overall functioning of the school because
they enter with different needs, ambitions, and skills than do other teachers. Though
often ignored, the second and third of these effects, which occur outside ofTFA
classrooms, must be included when determining the value of the program and its relative
merits as compared to other strategies of recruiting teachers. In this paper I use panel
data on New York City students in grades 3-8 to estimate this net impact of TF A on a
school. The total TF A effect appears to be positive and significant, but to be smaller for
high-need schools, even after controlling for that need. TF A teachers also appear to be
markedly more effective in elementary school grades than in middle school grades.
2. The TFA Program
Teach for America targets recent college graduates of all majors and from a wide
array of colleges, many but not all of them very competitive, and others with experience
in leadership positions and a strong record of success, academic and otherwise.
Applicants are interviewed twice and assigned scores according to a metric, developed by
TF A, which emphasizes qualities it has observed in successful teachers. These include
past achievement, perseverance, critical thinking skills, ability to influence and motivate
others, organization, respect for others, and a devotion to the program's goals and vision.
Those whose scores meet certain levels are accepted, at rates are comparable to those of
an Ivy League university. Teachers commit to a two-year teaching assignment.
Most recruits have not studied pedagogy prior to entering TF A. Instead
all new Corps members attend a 5-week summer institute during which they attend
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classes on pedagogy and subject matter, and team-teach a summer school class with other
TFAers.
TF A targets low-performing, low-income, high minority schools which have
difficulty hiring enough teachers, particularly those qualified in math and science, and
those willing to teach special education. In the 2007-2008 school year TFA placed
approximately 5,000 teachers in 26 regions across the US and at least 3 new placement
areas will be added for 2008-2009. Most sites are in inner cities, the rest in rural areas.
Recruits are placed in a region based both on their preferences and qualifications.
Administrators in each TF A school are able to request teachers for a number of positions
from TF A, and choose from those in their area by looking through a book of resumes and
other information on candidates. This occurs over the spring and summer, at which time
they likely have not finished their other hiring. Again, corps members can request
subjects and grades to teach, but the needs of schools are privileged in making
assignments. Most TF A schools (90% in New York City) hire more than one TF A
member, and some employ several of them.
Once in their schools, TF A teachers receive periodic mentoring by a regional
program director. States and school districts generally require them to participate in
alternative certification programs, which vary from those which carry almost no
requirements to those which involve enrolling in a masters of education program.
Americorps education awards are available to fund a part of coursework, and TF A has
special agreements with colleges and universities in some areas with high requirements in
order to lower the cost of earning a certificate or degree. The programs that are most
useful for TF A teachers, and with which TF A has agreements, range from highly
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respected universities (Johns Hopkins) to lower profile institutions. Corps members are
paid the same as other new teachers with the same qualifications, according to district
pay schedules.
Most Corps members leave their initial teaching assignment after their two-year
commitment and almost all who remain do so after a third year. Kane, Rockoff and
Staiger (2006) estimated that, wit..lJ.in New York City, in a steady state 45% of all teachers
who had gone through the TF A program were in their first two years, as compared to
20% of traditionally certified teachers (P5). Boyd et. al. 2007 estimated that 25% of
teachers in the poorest 10% of schools were in their first or second year, so TF A teachers
appear to leave at a higher rate than even their peers in similar schools. In some cases
IF A teachers are replaced with new corps members, in others they are replaced by
another, non-TFA, teacher. Some who continue teaching move to charter, alternative,
and private schools, so their exit from the profession is overstated by many analyses,
which use district payroll and personnel records that may not fully count these teachers.
While these teachers are not lost to education, they are lost to the school system in which
they worked, and perhaps to the neediest students. Turnover is generally assumed to be
problematic because new teachers are not as good as they will be with some experience,
but it is also necessary in order for TF A alumni to attain many of the "backer" positions
from which the organization hopes they will contribute.
There are several impressive alumni success stories, but to my knowledge no truly
representative data exists. 57% of alumni responded to a 2007 survey by TF A. Of
respondents 67% remain in education, about half of whom teach (1/3 of the total). 35%
of those who remain teachers (1/9 th of the whole) move to alternative and charter schools,

6
leaving about 22% of alumni teaching in public schools. More than half of those who
leave the education field remain involved in social justice or poverty work (Teach for
America 2007). These numbers likely overstate the true involvement of alumni - those
who are still involved with the program's goals probably respond at higher rates than do
others. Also, because TF A attracts and selects people who are interested in social justice
in general and educational change in particular, it is unsurprising that many of its alumni
continue to address these issues.
The New York City Corps is currently TF A's largest, with 1000 members (out of
80,000 total teachers in the city public schools), placed in over 300 schools. Most are in
the Bronx, while others work in Upper Manhattan and Brooklyn. In New York, TF A
teachers must pass two written tests - one on general teaching skills and another on
subject matter knowledge - and emoll in either a certificate or M.A. program to begin
teaching. To continue after three years they must have received their master's degree.
New York City is unusual among TFA sites because another, fairly similar
program, New York City Teaching Fellows (NYCTF) operates in the city on a larger
scale. Fellows are generally older than TFA teachers, with only 30% coming directly
from college, and are selected to be career teachers rather than short-term teachers and
long-term backers. They tend to have done well in school and in the careers they have
pursued. Fellows undergo pre-service training like that used by TFA, and emoll in a
subsidized masters program while teaching. About 8,000, or 10% of teachers in the New
York Public Schools in the current school year, became a teacher through the fellows
program, even though it was only founded in 2000. Recently other programs following
the NYCTF model have begun, though generally not on the same scale. These are both
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alternatives to TF A for districts and schools in need of qualified teachers and an
extension of its model of selective, high-profile alternative certification.
3. Literature
Whether TF A is able to produce effective teachers has been the subject of debate
since the program began in 1990, and gained greater urgency in the late 1990s when
alternative certification programs began to proliferate. In recent years, as the program
has expanded, it has become possible to empirically test the effect of TF A teachers.
Raymond, Fletcher, and Luque (2001) and Darling-Hammond, et. al. (2005) addressed
the impact of TF A teachers on student academic achievement in Houston. Both found
that TF A teachers were generally the same or worse than teachers who had gone through
traditional certification programs, and better than those in other alternative programs, as
measured by their students' performance on standardized tests.
Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2006) studied New York City students in grades 4-7
in order to determine ifthe certification status of their teacher (TFA, New York Teaching
Fellows, international, and traditionally certified teachers) impacted their achievement on
standardized tests. Their results suggested that Teach for America teachers perform
slightly (but statistically significantly) better than the average teacher in teaching math
and essentially the same at teaching reading. Boyd, et.al. (2005) conducted a similar
study comparing teachers who had entered teaching through different pathways, also
using New York City data. They found that teachers who entered through alternative
certification routes were at first worse at teaching both reading and math than those who
had gone through a traditional teacher education program, but that the differences
disappeared after 2-5 years of teaching, at which point most TFA teachers leave.
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Glazerman, Mayer, and Decker (2006) received agreements from principals to
assign students randomly to classes in a sample of grades-within-schools which contained
both TF A and non-TF A teachers. TF A teachers were compared with all other teachers in
the same grade within a school to determine the differences between them. Their results
were similar to those of Kane, Rockoff and Staiger - TF A teachers were better than other
teachers at teaching math and the same at teaching reading.

Glazerman, et. al. also

examined TFA teachers' impact on other student outcomes - retention in grade,
assignment to summer school, disciplinary incidents, chronic absence, tardiness, and the
extent to which students disrupted classes - but found them to be the same as their
counterparts in all but the last category. Assessments of disruptive behavior came only
from a teacher survey, and as other things which might be associated with it, particularly
disciplinary incidents, were not different in TF A classrooms, the authors speculated that
the true difference may be that TF A teachers expect students to be less disruptive, based
on their own experience as students.
4. The TFA Effect

These studies, and all others which I am aware of, only address the effects of TFA
teachers 'on the students in their classrooms. TF A teachers should have different impacts
beyond their classrooms as well, because they enter with different skills, motivations, and
needs, and because their turnover structure is different than that of other teachers.
4.1 Quality
TF A teachers enter with less training than those who go through traditional
education programs, so they might be expected to need more guidance at first than other
teachers. Boyd, et.al's conclusion that alternatively certified teachers were markedly
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worse than their traditionally certified peers during their first 2-5 years, but then
performed at the same level, would suggest that this is true, at least at a classroom level.
In many schools in which TF A teachers teach, however, most new teachers do not come
through traditional certification, instead recruited through other alternative or emergency
certification programs. Where entrance requirements are low these teachers may begin
teaching with little or no training. Thus TFA teachers are at least sometimes no less
trained -and possibly more trained - than are their peers.
TF A teachers are also rigorously selected for a number of characteristics which
might predict their being more involved in after school activities and more able to seek
out the resources they need, be they mentoring, materials, or support from students'
families. Within the program teachers are trained and encouraged to engage in these and
other behaviors which TFA believes will make them more effective. Though many wellrespected traditional and alternative certification programs are able to be very selective in
the candidates they accept, they look for different things in candidates, and likely
emphasize leadership experience and the ability to seek out resources less than TF A does.
TF A also runs its own mentoring program. Other programs and school districts also offer
mentoring, but TF A's serves as a further method for the program to shape teachers
according to its ideal. It may be either be better or (less likely) worse than those offered
to other new teachers in the same school or district.

4.2 Turnover
TF A teachers are more likely to stay during the first 2 years, and more likely to
leave after year 2 or year 3 than are others (Boyd et. al. 2005). As noted earlier, their
overall turnover is higher than that for teachers in general in low income schools. Some
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turnover is a good thing, as some corps members discover that they are not skilled at
teaching, despite the rigorous selection process TF A uses. That experienced by TFA
teachers is likely far beyond this level.
While many other teachers move from low- to middle- or high-income schools
after a few years, TF A teachers tend to leave education in general if they stop teaching in
low-income, high-need areas. Thus when they leave their teaching-specific skills are
lost, rather than being transferred to a different group of students. Hanushek, Kain and
Rivkin (2005) found empirical gains in student test scores to be significant over the first 2
years, but not after. The conclusion by Boyd et.al. that alternatively certified teachers
were even worse than other starting teachers but caught up after a few years is
particularly troubling, as most TF A teachers have left their initial schools by then.
Turnover forces schools and teachers to build social capital- the relationships,
understandings and systems which allow people to work together effectively - more
often. Even in schools with high levels of turnover, some amount of social capital is
necessary simply for the school to function. Faster rates of turnover should mean that
more time, in total, is invested in the cultivation of social capital, and that the school is
less effective, on average, as it is more common for it to be in the early building stages,
when this capital most likely does not function particularly well.
Because there are indications that teachers are noticeably worse than they would
otherwise be during their first 2 years in particular, perhaps carrying on to the fifth year,
having many teachers who stay for only 2 -3 years may be worse than having some who
leave after 1 and some who stay beyond the third year, even if their average turnover
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were the same. If this is the case, TF A schools might be putting significant resources into
training teachers, only to have them leave teaching when fully trained.
Some have claimed that high turnover makes TF A unable to truly affect
education, as it means its teachers are relatively inexperienced and unprepared. TF A has
also been criticized as a well-meaning but mistaken movement in which a few young
people, at least on average whiter and higher income than the population they are serving,
expect to come in and "fix" systemic problems without understanding their underlying
causes (Darling-Hammond, 1994). Others have argued that TF A teachers are better then
other starting teachers by a large enough margin to compensate for their high turnover
rate. Kane, Rockoff and Staiger, 2006, estimated that TF A teachers would have to create
a .02 standard deviations difference to compensate for their high exit rate, approximately
what they found. This only accounts for the in-classroom effects of turnover, so a full
accounting of the loss to the school would be somewhat higher, but so would a full
estimate of their benefits.
Rather than attempting to slow the turnover of its teachers by recruiting those who
are interested in education as a career, TFA focuses on those who are willing to make the
two-year commitment and it predicts will be successful as teachers. Corps members are
not required to attain any more education-specific credentials than are mandated by local
certification requirements, and are not specifically encouraged to stay in teaching for the
long term. TF A does, however, have partnerships with corporations and fellowships,
encouraging college graduates to defer their offers for two years in order to teach, and
with programs which offer training in education administration. This is not surprising -
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for TFA's goals, as it understands them, to be reached, many or most of its alumni must
leave teaching for other positions in administration, politics, and elsewhere.
5. Data

In order to test the presence and size of these quality and turnover effects, I use
school-level panel data on scores from the New York City Department of Education
(NYCDOE) and yearly Report Cards, produced by New York State, which list school
characteristics. Students in grades 3-8 are given yearly tests in English language arts and
math in New York City. The score data is available for the years 1998-1999 to 20062007, while characteristic data is currently only available for the years 2003-2004 to
2005-2006. TF A has identified the schools in which it placed teachers, and the number
placed there, for the years 1999-2005, which gives me a full count of TFA for the 20002001 to 2005-2006 years. Because oflimitations imposed by the construction ofthis
data, I only fully use the years 2003-4 and 2004-5, the English Language Arts test, and
districts 1-10 and 12 (out of31 in the city.) Data on student scores and TFA placement in
prior years is included in my data. The districts chosen include almost all of the TFA
teachers placed in New York City during the 1999-2005 period and more than 300,000
students in 2003-2004.
Table 1.
I

i Variable Means and Standard Deviations
I
I Percent TFA

Mean
2.190

Std. Deviation
5.046

Percent Free Lunch

73.856

24.933

Percent Latino

56.430

23.158

Percent Black

28.942

18.619

16.350

14.292

I Percent LEP
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Score
Change in Score

645.495

28 .651

4.897

10.752

Using student test scores to measure teaching skill or the impact of schooling is
imperfect. Many importantthings which students learn are not well measured by tests,
and some of them may detract from the kind of learning which is tested. However, they
provide a proxy for learning, and are far easier to work with than even the most tangible
of qualitative measures. I believe that they are a particularly strong proxy in the
elementary grades when the tests focus mostly on basic skills, for low-performing
students, for whom the additional material learned is, again, a basic skill, and in reading
and math, where curriculums cover the same material, if sometimes in different ways.
While they are imperfect, they are also better than useless.
It may be that some kinds of teachers are more dedicated to testing, or that some

see it as an end and other as a means. If, for instance, TFA teachers were less concerned
with testing than others because they did not seek to move up the standard career ladder
for teachers, we could expect their students to achieve lower on tests, in comparison to
other students, than their actual achievement should predict. Given TF A's support for
standardized testing, and their insistence that teachers make 1.5 grade levels of
improvement with students in each year, it is unlikely that they are systematically less
concerned with testing results (McClaugherty Cosner 2007). If school-level emphasis on
tests is correlated with some independent variables, or differs noticeably between TF A
and non-TF A schools I am unable to test for it, and it will appear as differences in student
outcomes.
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6. Model and Results
Educational production functions relate some vector of student characteristics and
some vector or vectors of characteristics associated with school, teacher, district, etc. to
student outcomes, usually measured by test scores. Because of the data available to me I
use school average scores and characteristics.
6.1 Controlling for prior year score

A value added model, using gains in scores rather than absolute scores as the
dependent variable, describes the effect of all inputs in the year studied, rather than all
cumulative past effects. The previous year's score represents the accumulation of past
teaching, family, and peer effects, as well as individual intellect, and may predict the
student's environment in the year studied. It is also possible that teaching certain levels
of skills is easier for particular teachers or teachers in general. For these reasons I
include the previous year's score as an independent variable within the value-added
specification.
The NYCDOE uses the percent of students receiving free lunch and classified as
Limited English Proficiency to place schools in categories according to need. They are
also often strong predictors of student scores. Race is intended to proxy for cultural and
other dynamics which may cause families and students to value and think about learning
differently, and is traditionally included.
(1)

Yijt = u) + U2Sijt-l + U3Bjt + U4Ljt + usLEPjt + u6Freejt+ u7TFAjt + Cijt

Yijt is the change in the average score for grade i at school j, in year t from year t-l. Sijt-l
is the grade's average score in the past year, Bjt and Ljt the percent of Black and Latino
students, respectively, LEPjt is the percent of students classified as Limited English
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Proficiency, and Freejt is the school percent eligible for free lunch. TF Ajt is the
percentage of the school's teachers who are in the TFA program.
In order for this model to be valid, I assume that unobserved education inputs are
not correlated with the decision to request TF A, or to place them in a particular school
when the analysis is restricted to those schools in the TF A labor market. It does seem
possible, however, that the schools which decide to work with TFA have either higher
(more dedication to learning) or lower (more difficulty attracting qualified teachers)
levels of teaching quality than do their peers.
In order to test this assumption I regress the percent of TF A teachers in a given
school against the school characteristics and average score from the previous year. If the
coefficient on the average score were significant it would suggest that determinants of
student test scores which were not effectively proxied for by the observed characteristics
were involved in the assignment of TFA to schools. As a result, I would be unable to
identify the direction of causality of any link between TF A and test scores. Results
appear in Table 2. The coefficient on prior year score is not significant (t

= .033), but the

adjusted R-squared for the equation is very low (.014.) Some other unobserved, perhaps
random, component or components must be responsible for most of the variation in the
percent of TF A in a school. As it is not correlated with student scores this will at least
not bias the results.
The value-added model suggests that introducing TF A teachers provides a small
but significant increase in student scores over time. The percent receiving free lunch and
prior year score carry significant coefficients in the expected direction. Percents nonwhite and Limited English Proficient are not significant.
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However, the data suffers from heteroskedasticity - larger schools have less
volatile average scores than do small schools and individual grades within schools. The
residuals are also auto-correlated (Durbin-Watson of2.912,) suggesting that scores
fluctuate more or less randomly around a mean for a given school, so that a year with a
high score will be followed by one with negative or fairly small change. In order to
obtain unbiased estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients I use the Newey-West
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent variance estimator. Results appear in
Table 4. The percent of TF A teachers and of students receiving free lunch are significant
at the 1% level, the former positive and the latter negative. Prior year score is also
significant, and positive, at the 1% level. The percent of students who are Black, Latino,
or limited English proficient are insignificant.
The adjusted R-squared of this regression is very small, suggesting that omitted
variables and random fluctuation are responsible for the great majority of score change.
If omitted variables are correlated with the regressors used OLS estimates of the
coefficients will be biased. In order to test for this correlation I regress the residuals of
equation (1) on the independent variables. All coefficients are extremely insignificant,
and the adjusted r-squared is also very small. Results appear in Table 3.
6.2 Controlling for prior year change
While controlling for prior year score takes all past inputs into account, it may
include experiences whose effects ended sometime in the past. These may continue to
affect a student's level of knowledge and skills without also affecting their accumulation.
If a student experiences a random shock to their education in one year, i.e. missing a
period of school, they might achieve less that year, but, as long as the disruption did not

17
recur, would achieve their normal amount in subsequent years. Controlling for prior year
progress instead shows the change in the schools' ability to produce learning.

(2)

Yijt = (X,l + (X,2 Y ijt-l + (X,3Bjt + (X,4Ljt + a5LEPjt + a 6Freejt +

ex7 TFAjt +

Eijt

This specification appears to better explain change in scores - the adjusted Rsquared is .13 7 - though unobserved variables still playa very large part. Interestingly,
the coefficient on previous year change is negative. The effect of the percent of TF A in a
school appears to be significant, positive, and slightly larger than that in equation (1),
though still small. The coefficient on the percent of students receiving free lunch is also
significant and negative. Those on the percents Black, Latino, and Limited English
Proficient are insignificant.
The data continues to suffer from heteroskedasticity and serially auto correlated
residuals. After correcting for this, again by using Newey-West heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation corisistent variance estimates, the effect of TFA teachers is significant
and positive, and the effects of the percent of students who are Latino or receive free
lunch significant and negative. Interestingly, the coefficient on prior year change is
negative, significant, and far larger in magnitude than are any others. This might suggest
that change becomes increasingly difficult as more progress is made, or, perhaps more
likely, that many schools experience one-off increases in scores, leading to negative
change in the next year. Results appear in Table 4.
Again, the adjusted R-squared is very small, so omitted variables are a concern.
Random changes are likely the cause of much of the variation, but many variables which
may affect education outcomes are not included. Testing reveals that any omitted

18
variables are uncorrelated with the independent variables, so they at least do not bias the
results. Test results appear in Table 3.
6.3 Elementary vs. Middle School Grades
TF A teachers tend to be overrepresented in elementary schools, both in New York
City and in general, so restricting my analysis to elementary grades may better highlight
the impact TF A teachers have on schools. More importantly, education occurs very
differently in early grades than it does later. A single teacher has the opportunity to
affect more students in a given year at a middle school, but also plays a smaller part in
determining a given student's progress. To a certain extent the skills and knowledge
which are taught in early grades are different from those addressed later, the former
emphasizing behavior and learning techniques, the latter more factual knowledge.
Teachers in elementary schools are forced to understand and communicate all subjects,
while those in middle schools are expected to have more depth and less breadth in their
knowledge and teaching abilities. The students too are different, both developmentally
and in their experiences, requiring different strategies and character traits to teach well.
Comparing elementary and middle schools is complicated by the fact that some
schools change to a standard middle and high school paradigm - separate classes for
separate subjects, some amount of student choice, and increased leveling or tracking - in
th

6 grade, while others do not do so until the 7th grade. In other schools there may be a
transition over the course of several years. In order to account for this I use equation (1)
th

th

with a break at both the 6 and 7 grades, correcting for heteroskedasticity and serially
autocorrelated residuals with Newey-West estimates. The results are quantitatively
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different, but qualitatively similar, so I will discuss only the results with the break at the
7th

grade. Regression results for both appear in Table 5.
The regression for middle schools accounts for almost ten times as much of the

variation in scores as does that for elementary schools (adjusted R-squared of .198 versus
.025.) The coefficient for prior year score is negative for both groups, perhaps suggesting
that change is smaller when students start at a higher level. The effects of all background
variables are markedly larger for the middle school group, with the exception of the
percent of students receiving free lunch, which is approximately the same. The percents
of Latino and LEP students are not significant for elementary schools, but are at the .01
and .05 levels, respectively, for middle schools. Students classified LEP in middle school
were likely not in the district, or perhaps even in the country, when they went through
elementary schools, so their lower scores may be associated with missing the early years
of the US or N ew York City education system as much as with not speaking English
fluently. This suggests that a student's background and academic history are far more
deterministic in later years, and that this carries over to the school level.
The effect of TF A is positive for both groups, but only significant for elementary
school students (using the 6th grade as a break point makes the TFA effect in middle
schools significant, though still much smaller than that in elementary schools.) This is
somewhat surprising, as subject matter knowledge, which TF A teachers tend to have a lot
of, is generally understood to be more important in later grades, while teacher training,
which TFA teachers have relatively little of, is expected to be more important in earlier
grades. It might be that the energy and idealism which TFA teachers tend to have is more
important to teaching younger students, or even that younger students are more receptive
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to them. In any case, it suggests that TFA's decision to place its teachers largely in
elementary schools is an efficient one.
6.4 Functions Allowing for Interaction
The level of one education input likely affects the effectiveness of others. For
example, teacher skill might have a larger effect when the students are further behind or
are learning in a language in which they are not fluent. Studies which have allowed for
some sort of interaction between inputs have found inputs to be statistically significant
more often than those which have not, suggesting that imposing a simple linear structure
on the educational production function excludes considerable information (Figlio, 99). In
order to allow for interaction I estimate a logarithmic function:

(3)

Ln(Yijt)= UI + u2In(Sijt-l) + u3In(Bjt) +u4In(Ljt) + usln(LEPjt) + u6In(FREEjr) +
u71n(TF AjD + Eijt

After correcting for heteroskedasticity and serially autocorrelated residuals the effect of
TF A is positive and significant. Aside from this, only free lunch appears to be
significant, in the expected direction, and of larger magnitude. Results appear in Table 4.
While the logarithmic function allows the level of one input to affect the
effectiveness of another, it does little to illuminate how this occurs. For this task a model
with interaction terms is necessary. I interact the percentage of TFA teachers in a school
with all background variables and the prior year score.

(4)

Yijt = UI + U2Sijt-1 + U3Bjt + U4Ljt + usLEPjt + U6Freejt+ u7TFAjt

+ U8Sijt-l *TFAjt + U9Bjt*TFAjt + ulOLjt*TFAjt + ullLEPjt*TFAjt + u12Freejt*TFAjt
+ Eijt
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Results appear in Table 6. TF A appears to be less effective in schools with higher
percentages of students with free lunch, higher percentages of Latino students, and lower
prior year scores. The coefficients on all these variables when not interacted with the
percent of teachers who are TF A are all insignificant with the exception of prior year
score. This suggests that schools with TFA teachers have a harder time than others at
helping high-minority, low-income, and limited-English students succeed than they
would a' student population with lower need, and that this gap is larger than that faced
with non-TF A schools, and implicitly non-TF A teachers. It may be that the skills TF A
teachers tend to lack, specifically pedagogical training, are more important in teaching
high-need students, or that the schools in which TFA teachers teach are less able to
address the needs of these students. The difference in the backgrounds of students and
teachers may also matter - TF A teachers have a higher probability of being white and
relatively affluent than do either the students they teach or the other teachers in that
school.

In a hypothetical extremely high-need school with 1% TF A, 100% free lunch
eligibility, 30% of students classified as Limited English Proficient, and a scale score of
600, the net effect of TF A would still be positive, though insignificant. TF A's decision
to focus on high-need schools does not appear to harm them. It does mean that TF A
teachers may be powerless to change education for the highest-need students by their
work in the classroom.
Placing TF A teachers in the more difficult schools may, however, be an efficient,
or at least effective, way of producing motivated backers and national attention. To the
extent that these focus resources and energy on the education gap TFA's placement
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policy may be a good choice for producing overall change, which, rather than immediate
student achievement, is the organization's end goal.
7. Conclusion

Teach for America depends on the teachers it recruits and trains to act as the foot
soldiers for educational change. While several studies have evaluated their impact on the
students they teach, none before has sought t6 find the school-level effect of TF A
teachers, which should be the most pertinent to decisions by school administrators on
whether or not to hire TF A teachers. It appears that TF A teachers do have a distinct
positive effect on the schools they teach in. Unfortunately, this level of data does not
allow me to decompose the TF A effect into turnover and quality effects, or to probe the
potential of TF A teachers to affect the labor market. That this effect differs markedly
between elementary and middle school-level classes is somewhat surprising, but it also
suggests that TFA has been placing its teachers in the correct level of classes, though
perhaps unknowingly.
Perhaps most interesting is the finding that TF A teachers would be most effective
with students they are unlikely to encounter, and which the program does not focus on. It
may be that special teaching skills are more necessary for students with fewer advantages
and less history of performance, or that TF A teachers struggle to connect to students who
tend to come from a different background than theirs. The solution to this problem
depends on which of these is its source, which could be probed with richer data on
teacher characteristics. In any case, it would be a useful one for TFA, and other
alternative certification programs, to know and implement.
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Table 2. TFA placement (Section 6.1)
Dependent Variable
Specification .
Constant
Prior Percent Free
Lunch

-

Percent TFA
TFA Placement Bias
Coefficient Std. Error
**1.597
0.223

0.002639

0.00818

Prior Percent Latino

0.0119

0.007625

Prior Percent Black

0.00774

0.00822

0.000408

0.00813

1.13E-05

0.000398

Prior Percent LEP

I Prior Score
I

All standard error and significance estimates in this and following tables made using the
Newey-West heteroskeasticity and serial autocorrelation consistent variance estimator.
* Significant at .1 level
** Significant at .05 level
*** Significant at .01 level
Table 3. Tests of Correlated Residuals and Independent Variables (Section 6.1 and 6.2)

Dependent Variable

Residuals

Specification

Prior Year Score
Coefficient Std. Error
-3.74E-15
0.596

Constant

Prior Year Change
Coefficient Std. Error
1.48E-14
0.789

PercentTFA

-6.84E-18

0.0334

8.13E-17

0.047

Percent Free Lunch

-2.21E-16

0.00876

2.26E-16

0.0101

Percent Latino

2.00E-16

0.0104

-5.73E-16

0.0126

Percent Black

1.71E-16

0.0112

-2.09E-16

0.0136

Percent LEP

1.03E-16

0.0283

3.64E-16

0.017

Prior Year Score

4.21 E-18

0.00032
-9.06E-17

0.0243

Prior Year Change
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Table 4. Value Added Models and Logarithmic Model (Sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.4)
Dependant
Variable

Change in Score
Log Change in Score

Specification

Prior Year Score
Coefficient Std. Error

Prior Year Change
Coefficient Std. Error

Constant

***2.297

0.596

***6.722

0.808

Percent TFA

***0.111

0.0333

***0.134

0.0431

Percent Free Lunch

***-0.031

0.00876

**0.0209

0.00949

Std. Error

Constant

Coefficient
***57.292

Log(Percent TFA)

**0.115

0.0495

Log(Percent Free Lunch)

***0.346

0.0957

9.558

Percent Latino

0.0107

0.0103

0.012

0.0123

Log(Percent Latino)

-0.237

0.207

Percent Black

-0.0168

0.0112

*-0.0249

0.0133

Log(Percent Black)

0.0458

0.0756

-0.00885

0.0283

-0.0302

0.0253

Log(Percent LEP)

0.141

0.11

***0.00715

0.00032

Percent LEP

Prior Year Score
Prior Year Change

Log(Prior Year Score)
***-0.440

0.0359

***9.420

1.464
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Table 5. Elementary and Middle School Grades
Dependant Variable
Specification

Change in Score
Grades 3-5

Grades 6-8
Coefficient
***195.585

0.0813

**0.0846

0.039634

***-0.0564

0.0134

***0.0618

Percent Latino

*-0.0286

0.01 64

Percent Black

***-0.0815

Percent TFA
Percent Free Lunch

Percent LEP
Prior Year Score

**0.173

Grades 3-6
Std.
Error
20.879

Constant

Std.
Error
10.16

Coefficient
***72.242

-0.0307
***-0.0933

Grades 7-8

Coefficient
***45.839

Std .
Error
10.039

Coefficient
***218.195

Std.
Error
32.577

***0.216

0.052

0.0761

0.0572

0.0174

***-0.0569

0.0122

**-0.0489

0.0223

***-0.123

0.0295

-0.00566

0.0145

***-0.130

0.337

0.0193

***-0.199

0.0311

**-.0549

0.0178

***-0.209

0.0378

0.0373

*-0.0734

0.0381

-0.0347

0.0348

**-0.124

0.0484

0.0147

***-0.258

0.0285

***-0.0535

0.0144

***-0.291

0.0443

26
Table 6. Interaction Term Model (Section 6.4)
Dependent Variable

Change in Score

Specification

Interaction Terms

Constant

Coefficient
***2.232

Std. Error
0.598

0.7555

0.666

Percent Free Lunch

***-0.0304

0.00966

Percent Free Lunch * Percent TFA

*-0.00538

0.00321

0.00361

0.00981

-8.54E-05

0.00809

Percent Black

-0.01429

0.0118

Percent Black * Percent TFA

-0.00273

0.00731

0.0235

0.0241

**-0.00949

0.00434

***.00685

0.000368

**0.000157

7.54E-05

Percent TFA

Percent Latino
Percent Latino * Percent TFA

Percent LEP
Percent LEP * Percent TFA
Prior Year Score
Prior Year Score * Percent TFA
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